Departure from Pacifism: Japan and a Taiwan Military Contingency > Articles

Public discussion on issues related to national security, led by the Abe administration, led to a widening of Japan’s options to respond to external threats. Debates over defense legislation in 2015 further intensified public discussion on security policy, resulting in a more pragmatic and realistic notion of security issues among the public. Such discussions used to be narrow, focusing only on an armed attack against Japan. Now the public is aware of the importance of a wider conception of national security including Japan’s possible responses to regional contingencies as well as wars more remote from Japan, such as the Gulf and Iraq wars. As we have seen, Taro Aso even touched on the applicability of changed defense policy to a Taiwan contingency. 

Recent developments around the Senkaku Islands with China have continued to draw keen attention from the public. The islands used to be under US military administration until the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972, and have been under Japanese control ever since. Nonetheless, China claims territorial rights. Recently, Chinese Coast Guard ships and fishing boats have come into the contiguous zone on a near-daily basis and even entered territorial waters several days a month. As a result, threat perception on the part of the public has become keen and the appreciation of national security issues has deepened.

This interest seems to have grown after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The public realizes that military aggression is not a thing of the past. It also has become apparent that such military action carries severe costs for the aggressor. People under attack are not easily forced to surrender to an aggressor’s will; this might be particularly true in Taiwan where the parties are separated by a strait. One of the lessons the Japanese learned from the early phase of the war in Ukraine, however, is that whether a nation surrenders to an aggressors’ demands depends on the people’s will and political leadership. This can apply to the people in Taiwan. 

This more serious attitude towards national security in Japan has significant implications for Japan’s responses to military contingencies adjacent to its own territory. Because Taiwan is only 110 kilometers from Japan’s western-most island, Yonaguni-jima, there have been debates over whether any serious military contingency around Taiwan is equivalent to a military assault on Japan itself. For example, air combat around Taiwan could easily spill over within minutes into Japan’s territorial airspace. This argument may lead the public to support a response similar to what Japan would take in the case of an armed attack against Japan itself. In such a case, where the right of individual self-defense can be exercised, Japan can act more freely than if its response is based on the right of collective self-defense. In the event of a military conflict over the Taiwan Strait, because of its geographical proximity, the Japanese would likely sense a direct threat and possibly act to protect the nation, thus also protecting US forces stationed in and operating around Japan.

​THE JSDF'S NEW OPERATIONAL POSTURE

The policy and legal changes outlined above have recently been reflected in the JSDF’s defense posture, particularly in southwestern Japan. In short, The JSDF has become more effective, if not yet robust enough, in its area denial capabilities. These will be provided by mobile air and maritime forces such as fighter jets and naval vessels along with land components deployed on major islands in the region with anti-air and anti-ship missile units for local air and maritime denial. 

The National Defense Program Guidelines adopted in 2018, emphasize the modernization of equipment for the defense of the islands and surrounding waters near Japan. Examples include air-to-ship/land standoff missiles that can be launched safely from fighters flying beyond the range of hostile anti-aircraft missiles. This also includes improvements in the JSDF’s surface-to-ship missiles, research-and-development programs for high-speed gliding munitions and hypersonic cruise missiles. As for standoff missiles on fighters, the JSDF aims to introduce several types of missiles from abroad, whose range varies from 300km to over 800km. The revision of the procurement plan for the F-35 fighter in 2018 further increased the total number of acquired aircraft from 42 to 147. A program to position up to 42 F-35Bs on Izumo-class carriers will give the JSDF the air defense capability to defend the archipelago in a flexible manner.

In addition to the modernization of equipment, the recently enhanced JSDF deployment to the southwest looks promising. The first move was in 2016, with the activation of a JSDF coastal surveillance unit on Yonaguni-jima, followed by newly activated units on Amami-Oshima and Miyako-jima in 2019. This year, a plan to activate new units on Ishigaki-jima was announced. The respective units are composed of 500-700 personnel organized into a mixture of infantry-heavy security units, surface-to-air missile units, surface-to-ship missile units and supporting elements. This change may allow Japan to exercise its own denial capabilities. The gaps between major islands in the Southwest range from 150km to 200km between the East China Sea and the Western Pacific from Kyushu to just 100km away from Taiwan.

While the above-mentioned policies are purely for the defense of Japan, they have significant operational implications for any contingencies in the Taiwan Strait. One such point is a possible JSDF contribution to efforts to contest air and maritime superiority in the Western Pacific, around Japan’s Southwestern Islands, or in the East China Sea close to the Taiwan Strait. General David Berger, the Commandant of the US Marine Corp, has proposed an operational concept called the Expeditionary Advance Based Operation. The basic idea is to enhance the Marines’ contribution to navy efforts to achieve air and maritime superiority by rapidly deploying relatively small units with anti-air, anti-ship and aircraft ground support capabilities to areas of contest. Such units could provide naval and air assets with better conditions for their forcible entrance to the area of contest. The JSDF operational posture described above will have a similar function while being more static than the US Marine Corps. Anti-air and anti-ship forces based on major islands along with incoming Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces’ assets can be in robust support of rapidly deployed US naval and air assets. In the event of a conflict over Taiwan, such SDF capabilities would provide US forces with a safer environment through local air and maritime denial around the area of operations.

REMAINING AMBIVALENCE IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

While Japan’s capability to deal with issues related to Taiwan has improved, there are still caveats with respect to Japan’s policy regarding Taiwan. The first factor that may restrain Japan’s Taiwan policy comes from economic dependence. In the early 2000s, Sino-Japanese relations were called “politically cold while economically hot” when tensions arose over several issues such as prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine while economic interaction was still highly active. Indeed, there are differences between those who look at policy and national interests and the business world, which naturally is focused on the economy. The latter basically prefer better relations with China. In addition, regardless of party lines there are steady supporters for better Sino-Japanese relations among politicians as a result of the economic benefits for both the nation and particular companies. At the same time, Japan has always had significant economic interests in Taiwan, which is one of Japan’s top three trade partners along with China and the US. As a result, a number of Diet members support both strong Japan-China relations and strong Japan-Taiwan relations.

The second factor is the geographic proximity to China. Japan’s lifeline runs through areas that are by and large under Chinese influence. Japan’s sea lines of communication run from the East China Sea, the South China Sea, around the Indo-China Peninsula, through the Malacca Strait to the Indian Ocean. It would be extremely difficult to escape Chinese influence if Japan had decisively hostile relations with China. 

On the other side, it is not hard to harass Japanese activities abroad. Knowing that there may be tremendous damage to Japan in any clash with China, the government of Japan has been extremely cautious to avoid provoking China. For example, it tries to avoid any incidents around the Senkakus by limiting access to the area from the Japanese side. The government has recently sought to avoid tension through self-restraint and has been strictly restraining activities around the Senkakus such as fishing by local fisherman, political appeals by conservative activist groups and JSDF operations. Such activities used to be regarded as much less sensitive up until the early 2000s.

The Abe administration’s China policy reflected these competing considerations. Even though Abe was regarded as one of the most conservative politicians within the Liberal Democratic Party, he was also a pragmatic realist who sought to repair Japan’s relations with China, placing a high priority on diplomacy through a series of summit meetings with Xi Jinping. In the meantime, Abe never hesitated to touch upon sensitive issues such as human rights in Hong Kong, the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and China’s assertive activities over the Senkaku Islands.

CONCLUSION

Any attempts to challenge the existing order in Japan’s neighboring region, including the area around the Southwestern Islands, will cause unacceptable and fatal damage for every actor — Japan, China, Taiwan and the US. To avoid such a situation, one outcome may be a stalemate, with neither side able to achieve victory. In other words, it is preferable to create and keep a situation where no one can decisively win while no one will be totally defeated. In this sense, what the Abe administration did on Japan’s security policy in the last several years has made Japan better able to contribute to the international community’s efforts to make such a stalemate more likely.